DOL Finalizes Regulations and Related Exemptions on ERISA Fiduciary Definition and Conflicts of Interest in Investment Advice

The Department of Labor (DOL) has adopted its long-awaited final rule defining who is a fiduciary investment adviser, and has issued accompanying prohibited transaction class exemptions that allow certain broker-dealers, insurance agents and others that act as investment advice fiduciaries to continue to receive a variety of common forms of compensation, as long as they adhere to standards aimed at ensuring that their advice is impartial and in the best interest of their customers.

Going forward, individuals and firms that provide investment advice to plans, plan sponsors, fiduciaries, plan participants, beneficiaries and IRAs and IRA owners must either avoid payments that create conflicts of interest or comply with the protective terms of an exemption issued by the DOL.

Under new exemptions adopted with the rule, firms will be obligated to acknowledge their status and the status of their individual advisers as “fiduciaries.” Firms and advisers will be required to:

  • make prudent investment recommendations without regard to their own interests, or the interests of those other than the customer;
  • charge only reasonable compensation; and
  • make no misrepresentations to their customers regarding recommended investments.

I. What Is Covered Investment Advice Under the Rule?

Covered investment advice is generally defined as a recommendation to a plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant and beneficiary and IRA owner for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, as to the advisability of buying, holding, selling or exchanging securities or other investment property, including recommendations as to the investment of securities or other property after the securities or other property are rolled over or distributed from a plan or IRA.

A “recommendation” is a communication that, based on its content, context, and presentation, would reasonably be viewed as a suggestion that the advice recipient engage in or refrain from taking a particular course of action.

II. What Is Not Covered Investment Advice Under the Rule?

The final rule includes some specific examples of communications that would not rise to the level of a recommendation and therefore would not constitute a fiduciary investment advice communication, including:

  • Education about retirement savings and general financial and investment information. For example, education can include specific investment alternatives as examples in presenting hypothetical asset allocation models or in interactive investment materials intended to educate participants and beneficiaries as to what investment options are available under the plan, as long as they are designated investment alternatives selected or monitored by an independent plan fiduciary and other conditions are met. In contrast, because there is no similar independent fiduciary in the IRA context, the investment education provision in the rule does not treat asset allocation models and interactive investment materials with references to specific investment alternatives as merely “education.”
  • General communications that a reasonable person would not view as an investment recommendation
  • Simply making available a platform of investment alternatives without regard to the individualized needs of the plan, its participants, or beneficiaries if the plan fiduciary is independent of such service provider
  • Transactions with Independent Plan Fiduciaries with Financial Expertise. ERISA fiduciary obligations are not imposed on advisers when communicating with independent plan fiduciaries if the adviser knows or reasonably believes that the independent fiduciary is a licensed and regulated provider of financial services (banks, insurance companies, registered investment advisers, broker-dealers) or those that have responsibility for the management of $50 million in assets, and other conditions are met.
  • Employees working in a company’s payroll, accounting, human resources, and financial departments who routinely develop reports and recommendations for the company and other named fiduciaries of the sponsors’ plans are not investment advice fiduciaries if the employees receive no fee or other compensation in connection with any such recommendations beyond their normal compensation for work performed for their employer

III. Best Interest Contract Exemption

The Best Interest Contract Exemption permits firms to continue to rely on many current compensation and fee practices, as long as they meet specific conditions intended to ensure that financial institutions mitigate conflicts of interest and that they, and their individual advisers, provide investment advice that is in the best interests of their customers. Specifically, in order to align the adviser’s interests with those of the plan or IRA customer, the exemption requires the financial institution to:

  • acknowledge fiduciary status for itself and its advisers
  • adhere to basic standards of impartial conduct, including giving prudent advice that is in the customer’s best interest, avoiding making misleading statements, and receiving no more than reasonable compensation.
  • have policies and procedures designed to mitigate harmful impacts of conflicts of interest and
  • disclose basic information about their conflicts of interest, including descriptions of material conflicts of interest, fees or charges paid by the retirement investor, and a statement of the types of compensation the firm expects to receive from third parties in connection with recommended investments.
  • Investors also have the right to obtain specific disclosure of costs, fees, and other compensation upon request.
  • In addition, a website must be maintained and updated regularly that includes information about the financial institution’s business model and associated material conflicts of interest, a written description of the financial institution’s policies and procedures that mitigate conflicts of interest, and disclosure of compensation and incentive arrangements with advisers, among other information.

IV. Additional Exemptive Relief

In addition to the Best Interest Contract Exemption, the DOL issued a Principal Transactions Exemption, which permits investment advice fiduciaries to sell or purchase certain recommended debt securities and other investments out of their own inventories to or from plans and IRAs. As with the Best Interest Contract Exemption, this requires, among other things, that investment advice fiduciaries adhere to certain impartial conduct standards, including obligations to act in the customer’s best interest, avoid misleading statements, and seek to obtain the best execution reasonably available under the circumstances for the transaction.

V. Effective Date

Compliance with the new rule is required as of April 2017. The exemptions will generally become available upon the applicability date of the rule. However, the DOL has adopted a “phased” implementation approach for the Best Interest Contract Exemption and the Principal Transactions Exemption. Both exemptions provide for a transition period, from the April 2017 applicability date to January 1, 2018, under which fewer conditions apply. This period is intended to give financial institutions and advisers time to prepare for compliance with all the conditions of the exemptions while safeguarding the interests of retirement investors.

During this transition period, firms and advisers must adhere to the impartial conduct standards, provide a notice to retirement investors that, among other things, acknowledges their fiduciary status and describes their material conflicts of interest, and designate a person responsible for addressing material conflicts of interest and monitoring advisers’ adherence to the impartial conduct standards. Full compliance with the exemption will be required as of January 1, 2018.

VI. More…

Regulations and Related Exemptions

DOL Fact Sheet

DOL FAQs

Supreme Court Rules ERISA Equitable Relief Can’t Reach Nontraceable Settlement Proceeds

Employee benefits plans regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or Act) often contain subrogation clauses requiring a plan participant to reimburse the plan for medical expenses if the participant later recovers money from a third party for his injuries.

On January 20, 2016, the US Supreme Court held, in MONTANILE v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE NATIONAL ELEVATOR INDUSTRY HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN that if an ERISA-plan participant wholly dissipates a third-party settlement on nontraceable items, the plan fiduciary may not rely on a subrogation provision in their health plan to bring suit under ERSA §502(a)(3) to attach the participant’s separate assets. Plan fiduciaries are limited by §502(a)(3) to filing suits “to obtain . . . equitable relief.” The Court previously held that whether the relief requested “is legal or equitable depends on [1] the basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim and [2] the nature of the underlying remedies sought.” Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547 U. S. 356, 363. In Montanile, the Court held that the Plan was not seeking equitable relief because it sought to recover against the defendant’s general assets, not specifically traceable assets. The lesson for Plan fiduciaries wishing to assert subrogation claims is to (1) put participants on specific notice of the subrogation claim as soon as the Plan learns of a significant incident of a type that might give rise to a subrogation claim (such as an accident); and (2) pursue the claim diligently before the participant receives settlement proceeds. We routinely include in our welfare wrap plan documents a vigorous subrogation reservation to protect Plans’ subrogation rights to the fullest extent practical.

More on the Montanile case…

Montanile was seriously injured by a drunk driver, and his ERISA plan paid more than $120,000 for his medical expenses. Montanile later sued the drunk driver, obtaining a 500,000 settlement. Pursuant to the plan’s subrogation clause, the plan administrator (the Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan, or Board), sought reimbursement from the settlement. Montanile’s attorney refused that request and subsequently informed the Board that the fund would be transferred from a client trust account to Montanile unless the Board objected. The Board did not respond, and Montanile received the settlement.

Six months later, the Board sued Montanile in Federal District Court under §502(a)(3) of ERISA, which authorizes plan fiduciaries to file suit “to obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce . . . the terms of the plan.” 29 U. S. C. §1132(a)(3). The Board sought an equitable lien on any settlement funds or property in Montanile’s possession and an order enjoining Montanile from dissipating any such funds. Montanile argued that because he had already spent almost all of the settlement, no identifiable fund existed against which to enforce the lien. The District Court rejected Montanile’s argument, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that even if Montanile had completely dissipated the fund, the plan was entitled to reimbursement from Montanile’s general assets. The Supreme Cour reversed for the reasons explained above.

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DOL Provides Timing Relief for Fee Disclosures in Participant-Directed Individual Account Plans

On March 19, 2015 the Department of Labor issued final rules that give retirement plan administrators a two-month window in which to provide annual fee disclosures to plan participants. Under existing regulations, plan administrators must provide fee disclosures to participants in plans with individually directed accounts at “at least once in any 12-month period, without regard to whether the plan operates on a calendar or fiscal year basis”. This 12-month rule presents some administrative difficulty because Plans that provide the disclosures in the same month every year could easily run afoul of the regulatory language if their disclosures are not done on the exact same day of the month each year.

The new rule replaces “12-month period” with “14-month period”, giving plan administrators a two month window each year in which to make the disclosures The new rules will become effective on June 17, 2015 (unless the DOL gets significant adverse comments on the rule, which is not expected). In the meantime, the DOL indicates that for enforcement purposes plan administrators can rely on the new rule immediately.

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